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Knowing what one believes sometimes takes effort—it sometimes involves 
seeking to know one’s beliefs as causes. And when one gains self-knowledge 
of one’s belief this way—that is, through causal self-interpretation—one 
engages in a characteristically human kind of psychological liberation. By 
investigating the nature of causal self-interpretation, I discover some 
surprising features of this liberty. And in doing so, I counter a trend in recent 
philosophical theories, of discounting the value of self-knowledge in projects 
of human liberation.  
 
 
Wo Es war, soll Ich werden  
(Where id was, there ego shall be)  
 New Introductory Lectures 
 
I would rather say, "Where superego was there ego shall be." 
Hanna Segal 
 
1. Know thyself 
Famous commandments notwithstanding, one can wonder about the value of 
self-knowledge. Spinoza, for example, holds that self-knowledge is the key to 
a moral life and personal liberation. Certainly, something seems right about 
the idea; but Spinoza’s doctrine rests on the claim that knowing one’s 
passions is itself sufficient to free one from them: “An affect which is a 
passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea 
of it.” And this claim is certainly dubious.1 As modern psychoanalysts know, 
we should be less than sanguine about the power of self-knowledge all by 
itself to liberate one from unwanted desires. One might come to know about 
one’s infantile desire but that no means suffices to make the desire vanish.  
Recent trends in philosophy share in pessimism about the value of 
self-knowledge for human liberation. Some philosophers cast doubt on the 
power of self-knowledge to effect important personal ends, and focus instead 
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on the power of practical elements of the self in creating valued conditions 
like freedom of the will and autonomy. On Harry Frankfurt’s view, for 
instance, freedom and autonomy arise with structural alignments of desires 
and volitions—a picture that seems to leave epistemic reflection without 
much work to do.2 This voluntarization of various projects of self-realization 
comes full circle in Richard Moran’s work, where self-knowledge is itself the 
object of voluntaristic re-construal.3 Self-knowledge, on Moran’s view, is 
itself best understood as a practical, and not an epistemic achievement, 
made when one takes a stand on what one desires or believes. On such a 
view, purely epistemic—in contrast to purely practical—self-knowledge is not 
of primary interest.4 
My aim here is to provide some counterbalance to these recent trends. 
We do have an interest in self-knowledge—first and simply because our 
beliefs, desires, impulses, fears and wishes are of fundamental concern to us, 
and we have an interest in knowing about what is of most fundamental 
concern to us; second, because distinctive kinds of human suffering result 
from finding oneself with prejudices one would disown, or acting upon beliefs 
or desires one has no knowledge of;5 and finally because, as I will argue 
here, self-knowledge can produce psychological change of a liberating kind. 
Just how, and just what kind of liberation are my concern in this paper.  
Briefly, to foreshadow: I will be concerned to identify a kind of 
psychological liberation effected by knowing one’s beliefs. In some cases, I 
will argue, knowing what one believes involves a distinctive self-critical 
posture, a posture one adopts when one seeks to know one’s beliefs as 
causes. And adopting and sustaining this self-critical posture produces 
important kinds of cognitive psychological freedom. Knowing what one 
believes, when one’s knowledge is gained through self-criticism, has special 
value. 
I should also note that in what follows, I will be restricting attention to 
what we might call quotidian self-knowledge of our beliefs. The contrast I 
intend is with, on the one hand, what we might call deep self-knowledge, of 
the kind one seeks in therapy, the kind investigated and produced in 
psychoanalysis, concerning unconscious mental states; and on the other 
hand what we might call basic self-knowledge, of the kind philosophers lately 
have been concerned to give account, whose chief feature is its effortless 
nature—for example, knowing that one now believes that one is awake.6 
Quotidian self-knowledge lies on a spectrum between deep and basic self-
knowledge.7 On the one hand, quotidian self-knowledge is generally more 
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easily gained than deep self-knowledge, but not so easily gained as basic 
self-knowledge—that is, it is not a routine by-product of consciousness. So, 
for example, it doesn’t take years of therapy to know that you believe, say, 
that a friend is making a mistake, or that a colleague is aggressive; but such 
a belief, should you have it, might not just announce itself to you, either. I 
should stress that, as different as quotidian self-knowledge is from deep self-
knowledge, I think it is continuous with deep self-knowledge. Indeed, a 
central upshot of my paper is that our means of gaining quotidian self-
knowledge—a means I call causal self-interpretation—is continuous with the 
kind of analytical interpretation that produces deep self-knowledge. 
The plan for the paper is this: in the next section, I seek to describe a 
route by which one can come to know what one believes. It is the route of 
causal self-interpretation. This is hardly the only way one comes to know 
about one’s beliefs, but it is a routine, and as we shall see, crucial means by 
which one knows what one believes (that is, by which one gains doxastic 
self-knowledge). In section 3 I explore cases where causal self-interpretation 
is, moreover, the only route to doxastic self-knowledge available to us. In 
section 4 I very briefly situate the causal self-interpretation account with 
respect to some other accounts of doxastic self-knowledge; and finally, with 
the ground thus cleared, in section 5 I investigate the liberating value of 
doxastic self-knowledge, when it is gained through causal self-interpretation.  
 
2. Causal self-interpretation 
In an important range of cases, we know what we believe only with effort. 
We must in these cases seek clues of our belief—clues found in characteristic 
mental events that the beliefs cause. The fact is we sometimes undertake a 
kind of causal self-interpretation, in coming to know what we believe. Or so I 
claim. In highlighting the importance of causal self-interpretation, I oppose 
much current philosophical thinking about self-knowledge of belief. Current 
philosophical thinking tends to see self-knowledge of belief as a kind of basic 
self-knowledge—readily accessible knowledge one has in virtue of being a 
conceptually competent and rational agent. My opposition to other 
philosophers is not of interest, of course—what is of interest is this: knowing 
what one believes has value; and important aspects of this value are 
revealed when we take account of the role of causal self-interpretation in 
gaining this knowledge.  
 But what is this causal self-interpretation that I say is central to self-
knowledge? A good place to begin is with ordinary experience, with those 
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events that unfold on our path to self-knowledge. When we attend to 
ordinary experience, as many have noted, we find a rich field of discrete 
elements. Many figures, scenes, and imaged phrases pass through one’s 
mind in any given stretch of wakefulness. And often, almost without noticing 
as much, one interprets these imagings (sometimes incorrectly) as being 
caused by specific mental states or attitudes.  
This sort of self-interpretation is, I believe, a common route to all 
kinds of quotidian self-knowledge. Here are some examples: in the midst of 
one’s daily activity, one pictures lemons, and where they’re to be found at 
the store, because (one thinks) one intends to buy some. One suddenly 
imagines the house and fields where one grew up, because (one thinks) the 
summer sun just now reminds one of the summer sun there. One hears the 
words “Point Reyes” in one’s inner ear, because (one thinks) one wants to 
see that part of California again. Assigning a cause is part and parcel of 
identifying the mental attitude that underlies the imaging. That is to say, 
assigning a cause is a way of identifying one’s imaging as the product of an 
intending, a remembering, or a desiring, to a specific effect. Assigning a 
cause is knowing one’s mind. 
I have argued elsewhere that such causal self-interpretation is a 
central means by which one knows one’s desires.8 I want to argue here that 
this sort of causal self-interpretation also has a role in one’s knowledge of 
one’s beliefs. My claim that self-interpretation is causal rests heavily on the 
careful description of our everyday experience, so let’s start by considering a 
case. 
Case 1: Owen is talking with an associate, and growing ever more 
uncomfortable with the conversation. He feels impatient with his associate, is 
upset at how the conversation proceeds. Only later, reviewing the 
conversation, is Owen in a position to understand why he felt aggrieved—his 
associate was giving Owen’s position too little consideration; he was 
dismissive. In coming to these judgments, Owen replays bits of the 
conversation, recalls his associate’s posture and tone of voice. (He sees in his 
mind’s eye various postures, hears in his mind’s ear the tone of voice, and 
words that were spoken.) All these particulars are what Owen recalls in 
seeking to make sense of his reaction. When Owen later self-attributes 
emotions and beliefs about the conversation, he seeks to make best sense of 
why he feels the way he does, and of those particulars of the circumstances 
that he continues to recall. 
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Cases like this are routine, but complex. What can we say about 
Owen’s self-knowledge here? There are several points to note before 
answering. First, when Owen says “how irritating!” or “he was dismissive”, 
Owen expresses his irritation and his belief; when Owen goes on to say, “I 
am irritated, because I believe he was dismissive”, Owen doesn’t merely 
express his emotion and his belief. Owen here makes a self-attribution of a 
particular emotion and belief.9 And his self-attribution of a belief has both an 
expressive and a reporting role. That is, Owen both gives voice to his belief, 
and simultaneously reports on its presence. (This is important to the value of 
self-knowledge; I’ll have more to say about the dual role of belief attributions 
below.)  
Another point to note: With his self-attribution, Owen also expresses 
his self-knowledge. We can distinguish aspects of quotidian self-knowledge 
here. In making the self-attribution, “I am irritated, because I believe he was 
dismissive”, Owen knows (i) that he has certain emotions and beliefs about 
his associate’s demeanor. In addition to knowing his emotions and beliefs, 
Owen expresses self-knowledge about the relation between these: he knows 
(ii) that his emotional reaction is driven by his belief about how he was being 
treated.  
How does Owen come to make these self-attributions? This is of vital 
interest to us, since we seek first an account of how self-knowledge of belief 
is possible, and second an account of its liberating power. So I want to focus 
on this question: How specifically does Owen come to self-ascribe the belief 
that his conversation partner was dismissive? On what grounds does he say 
“I believe he was dismissive”?10  
Some have argued that one correctly self-attributes belief solely on 
the basis of one’s reasons or evidence for thinking the belief true.11 In 
Owen’s case, the claim is, he has evidence that the content of his belief is 
true; that is to say, Owen can point to facts about his conversation partner’s 
behavior as evidence that he was dismissive, and on the basis of this 
evidence Owen self-attributes the belief that he was dismissive. Rational self-
interpretation, on this view, is the route to self-knowledge of belief. 
I think the matter is more complicated. I think our case reveals the 
fact that there is a mixed basis for self-knowledge of belief. Start with this 
fact: Owen knows that he feels irritation and that he believes he was 
dismissed, and he knows these both together—that is, he makes an holistic 
self-interpretation of both belief and emotion. Ascribing both is required to 
make best sense of the circumstances. Were he to self-ascribe the belief that 
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his associate was dismissive, and a feeling of elation, that would make little 
sense. Sense-making is a package deal. Moreover, Owen supposes, whether 
or not he has reflected much on the fact, that a belief about how one is 
treated can cause emotions like anger, disappointment or irritation. Owen 
deploys this much psychological understanding in self-attributing the belief.12  
What Owen’s case reveals is that there is a mixed basis for self-
knowledge of belief. As I noted, the rational self-interpretation theorist 
argues that one self-attributes belief solely on the basis of one’s evidence for 
thinking the belief true. I would agree that such evidence is indeed part of 
the basis of self-attribution of belief. That is, part of the basis of Owen’s self-
attribution of a belief (e.g. the belief that he was dismissive) is Owen’s 
evidence that the content of his belief is true. Owen can point to facts about 
his conversation partner’s behavior as evidence that he was dismissive. 
However, as our case makes clear, Owen bases his self-attribution on still 
more evidence. Another part of the basis of Owen’s self-attribution of belief 
comes with evidence of related mental states of his. He feels irritation; he 
repeatedly replays certain postures and tones of voice. Both what one 
images over and over again, and one’s emotional reactions, can serve as 
evidence for one’s self-attribution of belief. One understands that a belief to 
a such and such an effect precisely would cause imagings and emotions of 
such and such kind. In our case, Owen self-ascribes the belief that his 
partner was dismissive partly out of this understanding; he understands that 
this belief would cause just these reactions in him. In assigning the belief as 
a cause, he identifies his various imagings as the product of this particular 
belief of his. So it’s not wholly on the basis of evidence for the truth of a 
belief that one self-ascribes a belief. In Owen’s case, it is not wholly on the 
basis of his conversation partner’s behavior that Owen makes the self-
attribution “I believe he was dismissive.” Owen bases his self-attribution of 
belief partly on such evidence, but partly also on the evidence that his own 
emotional reactions provide, and the thought that these reactions have a 
cause (namely this belief).13  
What we learn from such cases is that there are two evidential bases 
for a self-ascription of belief. The first is evidence the world provides for the 
truth of the belief—a reason for thinking the belief true; the second is 
evidence one’s own mental states provide. We can call these two evidential 
bases for a self-ascription of belief the reason-giving and the causal bases of 
self-knowledge.  
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My case for claiming that self-interpretation is causal (or causal as well 
as rational) rests entirely on the description of our experience—when we 
attend to what goes on when we self-ascribe beliefs (as well as other mental 
states), we discover this about the nature of our interpretive efforts. 
Reflecting on ordinary cases, I don’t think anyone can doubt that causal self-
interpretation has a role in self-knowledge. But we might wonder how much 
of a role causal self-interpretation plays, in contrast to rational self-
interpretation. Perhaps when we make self-ascriptions, it is rational self-
interpretation, made on the basis of reasons for one’s beliefs, that is really of 
primary importance? This is a good question, and to begin to frame an 
answer, I want to explore how and when causal self-interpretation takes on 
primary importance. Toward this end, I will next investigate cases where one 
makes a self-ascription of belief based solely on causal evidence, and in 
direct conflict with one’s reason-giving basis. This happens chiefly when one 
discovers in oneself a belief that one finds irrational in some way—for 
instance, a belief that is outright biased or prejudicial, or a belief one 
unreflectively inherits from an authority. What is important about such cases 
is the way that causal self-ascription provides a crucial route to self-discovery 
and self-criticism.  
 
3. The role of causal self-interpretation in self-criticism 
I’d like to first clarify some terminology. Let’s return briefly to our case. In 
order for Owen’s self-ascription to (partly) have a causal basis, he must 
suppose, whether or not he has reflected much on the fact, that a belief 
about how one is treated can cause emotions like anger, disappointment or 
irritation. Thus Owen employs what some call a third-person perspective on 
his own mental states: he self-attributes a belief in part on the basis of what 
makes causal sense of why he has the self-attributed emotion. Of course 
Owen does not occupy this vantage point exclusively: Owen also finds 
evidence in his associate’s demeanor for the truth of what he believes about 
his demeanor. This is just to say, Owen also employs what some would call a 
first-person perspective on his own mental states: he self-attributes in part 
on the basis of his reasons for thinking his belief true. 
We can see, however, that speaking in terms of first- and third-person 
“vantage points” or “perspectives” is misleading, as it suggests that one can 
occupy only one at a time, and so to deploy only one set of resources for 
self-interpretation at a time. In fact, as I think our case makes clear, self-
knowledge involves both third-person and first-person perspectives at the 
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same time. It involves making a self-attribution that makes sense from both 
perspectives.14 So I prefer to say that self-knowledge involves both seeing 
causal relations among one’s states and seeing reasons for the attitudes 
themselves. One seeks the best self-interpretation one can find in light of 
both kinds of consideration. 
Next, we can note that the two bases for self-interpretation might 
come apart. Imagine Owen feeling irritation and anger at how the 
conversation went, and wanting to say, “I believe he was dismissive”, but not 
being able to find any reason-giving basis for self-ascribing the belief. 
Replaying the conversation, recalling his associate’s tone and look, he cannot 
produce a reason for thinking the belief true. If Owen is an apt self-
interpreter, if he’s any good at knowing himself, this tension in the bases of 
self-ascription will make him hesitate. (Indeed, he may chose to fall back on 
a different self-attribution, rather than “I believe he was dismissive”, he’ll say 
“I felt he was, but I can’t say why.”)15  
Now we can pose a question concerning how great a role causal self-
interpretation has. The question goes something like this: “So the case you 
have just outlined seems to show that the reason-giving basis for the self-
attribution of belief is required, doesn’t it? Without support from reasons, one 
cannot so much as make the self-attribution. When it comes to knowing 
one’s beliefs, then, causal self-interpretation alone seems insufficient; a self-
interpreter will always need a reason-giving basis for the self-ascription of 
belief, won’t she?” 
Answering this question begins with noting that, although the reason-
giving basis may routinely be part of a completely satisfactory ascription of 
belief, it is not required. To see that this is so, imagine another case where 
the causal and reason-giving bases of self-ascription come apart, but in this 
case, the causal basis provides overwhelming evidence in favor of an 
ascription of a belief that the reason-giving basis speaks against. A person 
who holds a prejudiced belief is a good example: 
Case 2: Cora has every reason to think that blue-eyed people are just 
as intelligent as brown-eyed people. On the basis of these reasons alone, she 
would self-ascribe belief that blue-eyed among us are just as intelligent. And 
yet, were she able to take account of the causal bases for a self-attribution, 
such as her negative emotional reactions to blue-eyed people, and her 
dispositions to treat them as inferior, Cora would have to self-attribute the 
belief that blue-eyed among us are inferior. (The tension this situation 
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produces would be great in an able self-knower. For others, the tension 
would be lessened by engaging in certain modes of self-deception.)  
What Cora’s case illustrates is that the reason-giving basis for self-
attribution is not required for self-knowledge. Were Cora to make her self-
attribution of belief in part or wholly on her reason-giving basis (that is, on 
the basis of what she has reason for believing), her self-attribution would be 
incorrect. (She could be stopped from making an attribution altogether, of 
course, but that is itself another failure of self-knowledge.) Since she doesn’t 
believe what she has reason to believe, she cannot get self-knowledge on 
reason-giving grounds.16  
In fact, one might make the stronger claim: in cases where one 
diagnoses irrational belief in oneself, the causal basis of one’s self-knowledge 
is crucial. In Cora’s case if she is to know her doxastic state, she must make 
a self-ascription of belief based on causal evidence, where this is in direct 
conflict with her reason-giving basis. In such cases, causal self-ascription 
provides one’s only route to self-discovery and self-criticism.  
Still, someone might press the line of questioning about the relative 
importance of finding reason-giving bases for self-knowledge, saying “Well, 
nonetheless, it is still more important in some sense to hear from Cora what 
she takes it she has reason to believe, and what she rationally commits 
herself to—and causal self-interpretation will be silent on these matters.”  
In response, I think we should agree that knowing what Cora takes 
herself to have reason to believe is very important. After all, this will be part 
of her basis for self-correction, as she tries to rid herself of her irrational 
belief. In a clear sense, moreover, the belief that she sees reason to have is 
more reflective of who she wants to be. And that too is a very important 
thing to know, and certainly a part of self-knowledge. And we should also 
agree that causal self-interpretation doesn’t tell one about these matters. 
What I disagree with is that any of these facts should lessen the importance 
(indeed the critical role) of causal self-interpretation. If Cora harbors a 
prejudicial belief that she sees no reason for, and if she can only self-
attribute on reason-giving grounds a belief in the equality of intelligence of 
the blue-eyed among us, then she fails to have significant self-knowledge. 
And she likely fails to be able even to begin the process of becoming who she 
wants to be. 
The point deserves emphasis: in many cases one does not need to 
consult causal evidence, and can make perfectly good self-ascriptions of 
belief on reason-giving grounds alone; however in cases where reason-giving 
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and causal bases support conflicting self-ascriptions (as in Cora’s case), one 
is epistemically at risk of failing to know the full facts about one’s beliefs if 
one confines one’s attention to reason-giving bases alone. In specific cases, 
moreover, the very possibility of self-criticism rests on the availability of 
causal evidence of one’s belief. So, causal self-interpretation is not only a 
routine means for knowing what one believes, but in cases of irrationality, it 
is vitally important, and plays a primary role. 
To recap, I have tried to suggest that one routinely makes self-
attributions of belief on a mixture of causal and reason-giving bases. In 
addition to considering what one has reason to believe, one also often has 
recourse to kinds of interpretation usually thought of as third-personal; 
specifically, one often resorts to inference to the best explanation, seeking to 
identify the causes of the various and sundry elements in one’s stream of 
consciousness, thereby to know one’s mind.17 Moreover, I have tried to 
sketch how, in some cases—especially of irrational belief—the very possibility 
of rational self-criticism rests on the availability of a causal self-
interpretation.  
I’ll have more to say about the value of rational self-criticism soon. 
But before going on to describe the liberating effects of self-knowledge 
gained through causal self-interpretation, I want very briefly to situate my 
account here with respect to two leading alternative accounts of self-
knowledge of belief. My main concern is to show that neither of these 
accounts handles irrational belief. In light of what we’ve seen here, that’s a 
significant shortcoming in each of the views I will consider. 
 
4. Two alternative theories of self-knowledge of belief 
There are several prominent theories of self-knowledge of belief.18 In this 
brief section, I do not aim to carry out a full critical assessment of any of the 
alternative accounts. My aim is only to orient my view with respect to two 
leading alternatives, so as to highlight the virtue of causal self-interpretation, 
as it accounts for how we might know about our irrational beliefs.  
The Transparency Account. Suppose that I am asked or prompted in 
some way with a question about my current state of mind: ‘Do I believe that 
p?’ In order to answer, I ask myself whether p is true, and consider the 
reasons for thinking the content p true; if I come thereby to judge that p, I 
will also thereby come to believe it, and in the same stroke know that I 
believe it.19  
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The so called transparency of one’s beliefs (and some would have it, 
other attitudes as well) is a matter of the question “Do I believe that p?” 
getting answered by addressing instead the question “is p true?” Beliefs are 
transparent in the sense that their subject matter is the sole concern of the 
rational agent. On the Transparency account of doxastic self-knowledge, it is 
this fact about beliefs that accounts for their unique epistemic availability. 
We have already seen something like the Transparency account at work 
above (section 2). One knows what one believes by attending to what one 
has reason to believe.  
I’ll set aside critical discussion of the substance of the Transparency 
account: the only point I want to note here is that, on this account, not all 
one’s beliefs are transparent to one, not all are discoverable through 
consideration of reasons for thinking p true. Restrictions apply: first, 
theorists interested in transparency confine their account to what some call 
‘occurrent’ beliefs—beliefs formed upon being prompted. Second, the account 
is restricted to occurrent beliefs formed rationally, upon making the relevant 
judgment concerning what one has reason to believe. So the Transparency 
account is restricted in its scope. Beliefs formed irrationally, through biasing 
mechanisms, or under various kinds of motivational pressure, cannot be 
known this way.20 
 
The Rational Supervenience Account 
Sydney Shoemaker famously argues that I know what I believe insofar 
as I am rational: self-knowledge supervenes on rationality.21 More 
specifically, if one is rational, then having various first-order beliefs at the 
same time constitutes having the second-order beliefs that give one self-
knowledge. Here is how Shoemaker traces the connection between rationality 
and self-knowledge: Imagine a rational creature, faced with new evidence 
from a fresh experience. If the evidence contradicts a current belief, then 
since the creature is rational, we can expect that a readjustment of attitudes 
will occur. But first-order beliefs and desires alone will not rationalize such a 
readjustment; some second-order beliefs are also required. Since being 
rational requires responding to new evidence with readjustments in one’s 
attitudes, and such readjustments are rational only if made on the basis of 
beliefs about one’s own attitudes, then being rational requires also having 
these second-order attitudes. And these second-order attitudes just are 
instances of self-knowledge. 
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Again, I leave substantive discussion of the account aside, and simply 
note here that, like the Transparency account, the Rational Supervenience 
account is restricted in its scope. As Shoemaker says, in speaking about 
cases of self-deception: 
What I have asserted… is a connection between self-knowledge and 
rationality; that given certain conceptual capacities, rationality 
necessarily goes with self-knowledge. It is entirely compatible with this 
that there are failures of rationality that manifest themselves in 
failures of self-knowledge. And such I assume we have in cases of 
unconscious belief.22  
So if one is irrational, and one’s second-order beliefs about one’s first-order 
beliefs are formed through biasing mechanisms, or under various kinds of 
motivational pressure, then the Rational Supervenience account does not 
apply to one.23  
As I have been emphasizing, each of these alternative accounts of 
doxastic self-knowledge explicitly restrict their domain of explanation. On 
each of these accounts, attention focuses on cases in which the subject is in 
some sense or other a rational, well-functioning believer. (What it takes to be 
rational and well-functioning may vary with each account, but that needn’t 
concern us here). As we might say, each account gives a story about self-
knowledge subject to provisos: the account only applies provided you’re 
rational, or provided your beliefs are formed directly from your rational 
judgments about what is to be believed, with no intervening pressure from 
your motivational side. About those cases where believers are self-deceived, 
motivated to disguise their own beliefs from themselves, or form beliefs on a 
less than reasonable basis, these accounts are silent.  
Now of course it is in just these situations that self-knowledge is 
important. In situations of self-deception, or motivated or biased belief, self-
knowledge can often be the first step to self-correction. So we precisely want 
an account of how the ordinary person, when less than rational, might come 
to know what she believes. (Returning to being rational in fact may require 
some self-knowledge, and it wouldn’t be much consolation to be told that 
we’ll have self-knowledge once we return to being rational.) So we need an 
account of how one knows what one believes when one is less than rational, 
less than fully responsible for one’s attitudes, and when the beliefs 
themselves are not immediately accessible for being immediately responsive 
to reasons. And here I think it’s clear that causal self-interpretation is what 
does the work.24  
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In the next section, I want finally to investigate the liberating effects 
of doxastic self-knowledge gained through causal self-interpretation. 
 
5. Liberating effects of doxastic self-knowledge gained through causal-self-
interpretation  
There are no doubt many ways in which self-knowledge can help one effect 
various goals of self-realization. For instance, one effect has been often 
noted in the literature on self-knowledge: If one knows something, then one 
has a justified belief about it;25 and a justified belief about one’s own 
attitudes produces normative pressure on the attitudes that are the object of 
one’s knowledge.26 In this way, justified belief about one’s own attitudes and 
feelings can produce normative pressures to change irrational attitudes. 
Change can come in a variety of ways: acquisition of new attitudes, or fuller 
realization of the functional role (both epistemic and practical) of existing 
attitudes. Having a justified belief about one’s own attitudes does not of 
course constitute these changes, as other psychic pressures can interfere. 
But in the well-functioning person, justified belief about one’s attitudes has 
as part of its functional role to produce normative pressures on the attitudes 
that are its object. These sorts of normative pressures have been noted by 
philosophers. 
What interests me is how self-knowledge of belief, specifically when it 
is had through causal self-interpretation, can produce psychological change 
of a liberating kind. In brief, the idea that I want to try to flesh out is this: 
Knowing what one believes, sometimes anyway, involves a distinctive self-
critical posture, a posture that one adopts when one seeks the causes of 
one’s beliefs. And adopting and sustaining this self-critical posture produces 
important kinds of cognitive psychological freedom. 
But what kind or kinds of psychological freedom? And what is the 
nature of this self-critical posture—how is it gained and how is it sustained 
long enough to permit one to become a better epistemic self? A little 
reflection reveals interesting ways in which causal self-interpretation permits 
one both to adopt and sustain a self-critical posture, and thereby achieve 
interesting kinds of cognitive liberty.  
Let’s begin with the question of how one comes to adopt the relevant 
self-critical posture in the first place. This can be quite a feat. The thing to 
notice is that if one has a baseless or irrational belief, then becoming one’s 
best epistemic self requires changing that belief; but changing a belief can be 
difficult, especially when it is baseless or irrational. The reasons for this are 
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complex, though one central source of difficulty certainly is this: In a case 
where one already has a prejudicial belief, merely considering what one has 
reason to believe is often not sufficient to produce the belief one ought to 
have. (If change were this easy, the world would be much more free of 
prejudice than it is.) Rather, considering what is reasonable to believe in 
such cases can instead result merely in a person believing that she believes 
the reasonable thing, deceiving herself about what she in fact believes. This 
creates a puzzle about how one can even begin to know about baseless 
beliefs, how one can even begin to adopt the required self-critical posture. 
For in such a case, one has to see oneself as unreasonable first, in order to 
rid oneself of unreasonable beliefs. And there are evidently psychological 
barriers to so seeing oneself. So how can one do this? The answer, I think, is 
clear enough: In such cases, knowing about the belief one should have is not 
helpful, for knowing this is of a piece with seeing oneself as reasonable. 
Seeing oneself as unreasonable is only possible if one knows about the belief 
one does have—i.e. the baseless belief. And, since rational self-interpretation 
won’t deliver this knowledge, one can only know about the belief one does 
have—the baseless belief—through causal self-interpretation. Causal self-
interpretation, then, is the only means one has in such cases to see oneself 
as unreasonable. Seeing oneself as unreasonable is the difficult entry point, 
the moment in which one adopts or takes up a self-critical posture regarding 
one’s own beliefs. So it is causal self-interpretation that permits one to adopt 
the self-critical posture that is essential to the process of ridding oneself of 
irrational or baseless belief.27  
Next, let’s consider how one maintains this self-critical posture, and 
the role of causal self-interpretation in its maintenance. One way to 
characterize the maintenance of a self-critical posture regarding one’s beliefs 
is to say that one stands apart from one’s beliefs. But standing apart is of 
course a metaphor—more concretely what it amounts to is that one reflects 
upon one’s beliefs as elements in one’s psychology, as opposed to merely 
acting upon, or more broadly living with one’s beliefs as commitments. How 
can such reflection be psychologically effected? I think a key element is in 
the manner in which one self-attributes one’s belief, specifically, that one 
formulates one’s self-attribution by explicitly reporting on the attitude in 
question. In our first case above, Owen moves from self-attributions that are 
mere expressions of the relevant attitudes (“how irritating! He was being 
dismissive”) to self-attributions that are both expressions and reports of the 
relevant emotions and beliefs (“I felt irritated with him. I believe he was 
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being dismissive”). What is the value of being able to explicitly formulate 
one’s attitudes in a report? Clearly, one great value is that it permits 
reflection on the justifiedness of the attitudes. Owen’s self-attribution “I 
believe he was dismissive” naturally invites the question of whether this 
belief is justified, creating room for self-criticism. If one were restricted 
merely to expressing one’s beliefs, one would not be in a position cognitively 
to turn on oneself, so to say, and question the belief.  
Another way to put the point is this: In the moment when one 
attributes a belief to oneself on causal grounds, one is not wholly occupied 
with reasons to think the content of the belief true.28 Reasons for thinking 
the belief true are only part of what one keeps in mind in making the self-
attribution. One’s self-attribution also must make sense of how one feels, 
how one is disposed to act, what one is occupied with in the way of mental 
imagings. Since one is not wholly occupied with reasons for thinking the 
belief true, one can also entertain the possibility that one holds a belief 
against reason. Again, were one confined to reason-giving bases alone for 
gaining self-knowledge, one would enjoy no such room for questioning.  
So causal self-interpretation creates the space to maintain the relevant 
self-critical posture. When one gains doxastic self-knowledge through causal 
self-interpretation, one stands apart from one’s belief. In knowing on causal 
grounds that one has a belief, one has room to question whether one’s belief 
is reasonable. That is a kind of “room for maneuver” that, in one’s cognitive 
life, marks an important liberty. 
Finally, I offer a more speculative point. I want to return to the issue 
of how one comes to adopt the relevant self-critical posture in the first place. 
As we saw, this is quite a feat; I think there’s more to say about the kind of 
cognitive liberty it produces. Start with a piece of common wisdom: Being 
able to make and take self-criticism requires maturity. But what exactly does 
this maturity consist in? In the case of self-criticism of one’s beliefs, more 
specifically, what does maturity require? We can start by returning again to 
the question of what is required to self-ascribe an irrational or baseless 
belief. First and foremost, it seems, one has to see the belief both as one’s 
own and without basis. What this in turn requires, I suggest, is a capacity 
simultaneously to free oneself from both the perspective of the internal critic 
of one’s beliefs and the perspective of the biased believer.  
In many cases, it is extremely unpleasant for creatures like us to own 
up to baseless or irrational belief. As evidence we find familiar cases in which 
the initiation of self-criticism generates not change, but self-deception. This 
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belief I would self-ascribe on causal grounds is seemingly baseless, so I find 
reasons for the belief after the fact (engaging in a kind of reason-creating 
rationalizing self-deception). Alternatively, this belief I would self-ascribe on 
the basis of reasons is not one I find any other evidence of having; but, 
determined to see myself as reasonable, I act in ways that produce causal 
evidence of my believing what I do not (engaging in a kind of evidence-
creating rationalizing self-deception). 
We can diagnose these kinds of self-deception: the psychic pressure to 
have reason for one’s beliefs is significant, and can overwhelm a person’s 
earnest efforts to know what she actually believes. We might put our 
diagnosis more vividly this way: What is often at work in cases of self-
deception is a need to see oneself as wholly reasonable, or as we might say, 
to identify entirely with the internal critic who delivers rational criticism. In so 
identifying, one seeks to see oneself as reasonable throughout, and thereby 
falls victims to one or another kind of rationalizing self-deception.29 
What is interesting are cases in which one resists this pressure. Clearly 
there are cases where, against the psychic pressure to see oneself as 
reasonable, sometimes, one makes the self-ascription of an irrational belief. 
And in these cases, instead of identifying wholly with the internal critic and 
thereby being led into various kinds of self-deception, one also owns up to 
the irrational or baseless belief. But—equally important—this is not to say 
that one identifies with the fallible believer, either. Were one to identify with 
the fallible believer, that would mean simply persisting in one’s irrational 
belief. A truly self-critical posture involves both seeing the biased belief as 
one’s own and without basis. And that requires freeing oneself from the 
perspective of the internal critic (who is of course wholly reasonable) and 
freeing oneself from the perspective of the biased believer (who is 
unreasonable). Self-criticism is possible only when one steps back from both 
perspectives, and adopts a perspective from which both the facts of what one 
believes and the facts about what one has reason to believe are visible. 
When one occupies this perspective, one can deliver the bad news to oneself 
about one’s irrational belief, correct one’s belief accordingly and get on with 
one’s epistemic life.  
If one can truly adopt a self-critical posture, then, one widens one’s 
perspective on one’s beliefs, and this marks a kind of maturity. Now, I 
suggest that this kind of maturity involves the attainment of a kind of 
psychological liberation, too. It is the liberation one has when one manages 
to free oneself from the pressure always to see oneself as reasonable—at 
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least long enough to succeed in making genuine self-criticism. Since causal 
self-interpretation is, again, a central means by which one assumes the 
relevant self-critical posture, it has a central role in producing this distinctive 
sort of freedom.  
On this last point, I am tempted to add an analogy. I think we might 
understand the freedom at issue on an analogy with Hanna Segal’s idea, 
namely, that our goal is the enlargement of the ego, or self, against the 
superego, or the voice of conscience. I find it suggestive to think that one 
achieves something like this kind of enlargement of the ego when one steps 
outside the perspectives of the internal critic of irrational beliefs and the 
fallible owner of them. The idea is this: when one frees oneself from the 
pressure to identify with the self-critical agency (the voice of epistemic 
conscience) one takes up the perspective of a person with an irrational belief 
(one’s self); and at that point, whatever criticism of one’s beliefs there is to 
be made comes from none other than one’s self, who is also the owner of the 
belief. What one gains in such moments of liberation is a “realistic” 
perception of one’s own epistemic state.30  
The analogy is, as I said, speculative. What is certain, I believe, is that 
causal self-interpretation produces various kinds of cognitive psychological 
freedom. In knowing on causal grounds that one has a belief, one has room 
to question whether one’s belief is reasonable, and that kind of room for 
maneuver marks an important cognitive liberty. Causal self-interpretation is 
a central means by which one assumes a distinctive kind of self-critical 
posture, one that involves freeing oneself from the pressure always to see 
oneself as reasonable.  
 
Conclusion 
In many important cases, knowing what one believes takes effort—it 
involves seeking to know one’s beliefs as causes. And when one gains self-
knowledge of belief this way, it can produce change of a liberating kind. Not 
because discredited beliefs simply go away—clearly nothing so simple 
describes our epistemic lives. Rather, because coming to know what one 
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1  See The Ethics, Pt.V Prop 3. Curley (1994, p247) translation. In 
this sense, one’s self-mastery increases as one’s self-knowledge does. 
2  For Frankfurt, a volition is a second-order desire that certain of 
one’s first-order desires be effective. See Frankfurt (1971).   
3  Moran (2001).  
4  Epistemic self-knowledge is a matter of having a justified true 
belief about one’s own attitudes, while practical  self-knowledge is a matter 
of endorsing, by seeing reasons for, one’s attitudes. For more on this 
distinction see also McGeer (1996). Some understand the attainment of self-
knowledge just to be the attainment of greater authenticity or autonomy, 
and some read Freud as having just this in mind by self-knowledge. See for 
instance Dilman (1984). My interest is in self-knowledge understood as an 
epistemic matter, the attainment of self-knowledge is a matter of justified 
self-ascriptions of attitudes, emotions, wishes, impulses and so on. 
5  See Velleman (2001). Though Velleman does not specifically 
speak of the distress caused by acting without self-knowledge, he does stress 
the role of a fundamental desire to know what one is doing, in the activity of 
autonomous agents. It is not hard to imagine that such a desire for self-
knowledge, when thwarted, produces a distinctive kind of human suffering. 
6  Not surprisingly, this effortlessness is itself difficult to explain, 
and requires significant theoretical efforts. See for instance Burge, T. and C. 
Peacocke (1995), Shoemaker (1996). 
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7  Let me also add that I think basic and deep are both important 
kinds of self-knowledge, deserving of investigation. But I also think the 
relative absence of accounts of quotidian self-knowledge needs remedy. 
8  Knowing What One Wants (forthcoming). 
9  Owen may just say “I’m irritated because he was dismissive”, 
dropping the explicit “I believe…” The point remains, though that he is now 
self-attributing a belief. I use the more explicit formulation to keep in view 
the fact that the case of interest involves self-attribution of belief.  
10  Note that self-attribution and self-knowledge are distinct. 
Questions about what makes a self-attribution an authoritative action can be 
distinguished from what makes a belief about one’s mental states an 
epistemically authoritative cognition. I blur these distinctions for ease of 
exposition here, but in other contexts they are worth remembering.  
11  For recent discussion of this view, see Shah & Velleman (2005). 
12  Some would call it theory, but whether folk psychology counts 
as a theory is a good question in my opinion—though this is not the place to 
defend my opinion. 
13  And also in what his imagination selectively replays for him as 
most pertinent about his partner’s behavior. But here we may say that it 
requires further reflection to ground self-knowledge: Owen may be sensitive 
enough to the fact that his replaying some features of his conversation over 
is a clue to how he feels or what he thinks about the conversation. In his 
mind’s eye he recalls the image of his associate interrupting. He may be 
reflective enough to ask  himself, Why do I keep returning to that? When he 
answers, “because I believe he was dismissive”, his self-attribution has as 
part of its epistemic ground this further fact that these are the salient 
features his consciousness selects to serve up. 
14  Moran’s (1994) paper is very interesting here. 
15  Here Owen doesn’t make a self-attribution of belief, but of a 
feeling. I would want argue that his self-attribution of feeling also has a 
causal basis, but I won’t pursue the argument here. See Wilson (2002). 
16  We can now see why with a self-attribution, one both gives 
voice to one’s belief, and simultaneously reports on its presence. Belief 
attributions have a dual role. In being made partly on the basis of reasons 
for thinking the belief true, a self-attribution expresses a commitment to the 
truth (and so “I believe that p” is another way of asserting, “p”); and in also 
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being partly made one a causal basis—that is evidence for thinking one has 
the belief—the self-attribution reports the fact that one has a belief. 
17  The resulting view is that inference, which has long been held to 
be irrelevant for knowing one’s own mind, has a significant role in gaining 
self-knowledge. This holds true as much for beliefs as it does a range of 
attitudes, such as desires, intentions, fears and hopes. If I have made self-
knowledge sounds complicated, well, it is. However, complicated or not, self-
interpretive exercises that balance causal and reason-giving factors are ones 
we routinely engage in. What we routinely try to do is complicated. 
18  Here I’ll confine my attention to those that make self-knowledge 
an epistemic matter, not a purely practical achievement. 
19  See Moran (2001) and Shah and Velleman (2005). 
20  I think cases like the one considered in the previous section 
show that even in the restricted case of ‘occurrent’ belief, one’s self-
attribution of belief may be epistemically grounded in more than reason-
giving considerations alone. I make an argument to this effect in “Knowing 
What One Believes” (manuscript). 
21  Strictly, being rational and having the relevant concepts of belief 
and so forth, are sufficient for one to know one’s beliefs.  
22  Shoemaker (1996, p.49). 
23  Note that Akeel Bilgrami’s recent work (2005) shares these 
broad features with Shoemaker’s account. Like the Transparency and 
Rational Supervenience accounts, Bilgrami’s account is restricted in its scope 
to the rational subject. 
24  By way of further situating my account, let me add that we 
might expect that defenders of each of the alternatives canvassed above 
would not object to the claim that causal self-interpretation is the basis of 
self-knowledge of belief in those cases where the provisos fail—that is, in 
cases where beliefs are formed or maintained through ‘irrational’ 
mechanisms. And for my part I agree that it’s important to know what one 
has reason to think true. Rational constraints on belief are a routine part of 
what one keeps in mind when one knows what one believes. 
25  Naturally not all philosophers agree. Some suppose belief has 
nothing to do with knowledge, others that justification has nothing to do with 
knowledge. I won’t take on these views here, but see Brakel, this volume, for 
more on this matter. 
26  Shoemaker (1995). 
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27  Since causal self-interpretation can be one’s only means of 
ridding oneself of irrational or baseless belief, causal self-interpretation can 
be one’s only means of becoming one’s best self. 
28  Likewise for desires, fears and other attitudes. One is not in the 
grip of reasons for thinking the content of the desire desirable, the fear 
fearful and so on. 
29  I don’t intend here to suppose that the internal critic is identical 
with the superego, the activity of which is far from wholly reasonable. By 
“internal critic” I mean aspects of one’s reflective self, and especially one’s 
reflective self as it is concerned with the rationality of one’s beliefs. 
30  This admittedly stretches Segal’s idea, for she had nothing like 
epistemic self-criticism in mind when she spoke of “perceiving realistic guilt”: 
She writes “…if the ego is an organ of perception of psychic and external 
realities then it is capable of perceiving the damage done in reality, or in 
phantasy, and that perception is realistic guilt, a guilt which is proportional to 
intentions and appropriate to the damage done. Freud said ‘Where id was 
there ego shall be.’ I would rather say ‘Where superego was there ego shall 
be.’ (Segal, H. “Comments On Charles Brenner's Paper: The Mind as Conflict 
and Compromise Formation”) 
31  Thanks for helpful comments to Lanier Anderson, Linda Brakel, 
Peter Rudnytsky, and Tamar Schapiro. 
